

# Logic, General Intelligence, and Hypercomputation — and beyond ...

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
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
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
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


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To rationally reject logic requires giving at least a precise argument for doing so.


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
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
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


Deduced, immediately: Rationally rejecting logic is self-defeating.




# Superminds

Subjective consciousness, qualia, etc. — phenomena in the incorporeal realm that can't be expressed in any third-person scheme



## Information Processing



(Information Processing)

$\Sigma_1$

Turing Limit

$\Phi \vdash \phi?$

$\exists k H(n, k, u, v)$

$H(n, k, u, v)$

(Information Processing)

$\Pi_2$

$$\forall u \forall v [\exists k H(n, k, u, v) \leftrightarrow \exists k' H(m, k', u, v)]$$

$\Sigma_1$

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Turing Limit

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$$H(n, k, u, v)$$

## (Information Processing)

analog chaotic neural nets, infinite-time Turing machines, Zeus machines, accelerating TMs, “knob” machines, ...

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
$$H(n, k, u, v)$$

$\Pi_2$


$\Sigma_1$

Turing Limit

# The (Large!) Space of Logical Systems



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# Conjecture

(see “Isaacson’s Conjecture”)

In order to produce a rationally compelling proof of any true sentence  $S$  formed from the symbol set of the language of arithmetic, but independent of PA, it’s necessary to deploy concepts and structures of an irreducibly infinitary nature.

# PA

$$A1 \quad \forall x(0 \neq s(x))$$

$$A2 \quad \forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x = y)$$

$$A3 \quad \forall x (x \neq 0 \rightarrow \exists y (x = s(y)))$$

$$A4 \quad \forall x (x + 0 = x)$$

$$A5 \quad \forall x \forall y (x + s(y) = s(x + y))$$

$$A6 \quad \forall x (x \times 0 = 0)$$

$$A7 \quad \forall x \forall y (x \times s(y) = (x \times y) + x)$$

**And, every sentence that is the universal closure of an instance of**

$$([\phi(0) \wedge \forall x(\phi(x) \rightarrow \phi(s(x)))] \rightarrow \forall x\phi(x))$$

where  $\phi(x)$  is open wff with variable  $x$ , and perhaps others, free.



# Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

Let  $\Phi$  be consistent and decidable and suppose also that  $\Phi$  allows representations. Then there is an  $\mathcal{S}_{ar}$ -sentence  $\phi$  such that neither  $\Phi \vdash \phi$  nor  $\Phi \vdash \neg\phi$ .